Section One of Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals

 In section one, Kant argues from common-sense morality to the supreme principle of morality, which he calls the categorical imperative. Kant thinks that uncontroversial premises from our shared common-sense morality, and analysis of common sense concepts such as "the good," "duty," and "moral worth," will yield the supreme principle of morality (i.e., the categorical imperative). Kant's discussion on section one can be roughly divided into four parts:

1. the good will;
2. the teleological argument;
3. the three propositions regarding duty; and
4. the categorical imperative.

The Good Will

Kant thinks that, with the exception of good will, all goods are qualified. By qualified, Kant means that those goods are good insofar as they presuppose or derive their goodness from something else. For example, wealth can be extremely good if it is used for human welfare, but it can be disastrous if a corrupt mind is behind it. In a similar vein, we often desire intelligence and take it to be good, but we certainly would not take intelligence of an evil genius to be good. The good will, by contrast, is good in itself. Kant writes, "A good will is not good because of what it affects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself." The precise nature of the good will is subject to scholarly debate.

The Teleological Argument

Kant believes that a teleological argument may be given to demonstrate that the "true vocation of reason must be to produce a will that is good." As with other teleological arguments, such as the case with that for the existence of God, Kant's teleological argument is motivated by an appeal to a belief or sense that the whole universe, or parts of it, serve some greater telos, or end/purpose. If nature's creatures are so purposed, Kant thinks their capacity to reason would certainly not serve a purpose of self-preservation or achievement of happiness, which are better served by their natural inclinations. What guides the will in those matters is inclination.

By the method of elimination, Kant argues that the capacity to reason must serve another purpose, namely, to produce good will, or, in Kant's words, to "produce a will that is... good in itself." Kant's argument from teleology is widely taken to be problematic: it is based on the assumption that our faculties have distinct natural purposes for which they are most suitable, and it is questionable whether Kant can avail himself of this sort of argument.

The Three Propositions Regarding Duty

The teleological argument, if flawed, still offers that critical distinction between a will guided by inclination and a will guided by reason. That will which is guided by reason, Kant will argue, is the will that acts from duty. Kant's argument proceeds by way of three propositions, the last of which is derived from the first two.

First Proposition

Although Kant never explicitly states what the first proposition is, it is clear that its content is suggested by the following common-sense observation. Common sense distinguishes among:

• (a) the case in which a person clearly acts contrary to duty;
• (b) the case in which a person's actions coincide with duty, but are not motivated by duty; and
• (c) the case in which a person's actions coincide with duty because he or she is motivated by duty.

Kant thinks our actions only have moral worth and deserve esteem when they are motivated by duty. Kant illustrates the distinction between (b) and (c) with the example of a shopkeeper who chooses not to overcharge an inexperienced customer. The shopkeeper treats his customers fairly, but because it is in his prudent self-interest to do so, in order to preserve his reputation, we cannot assume that he is motivated by duty, and thus the shopkeeper's action cannot be said to have moral worth. Kant contrasts the shopkeeper with the case of a person who, faced with "adversity and hopeless grief," and having entirely lost his will to live, yet obeys his duty to preserve his life. Because this person acts from duty, his actions have moral worth. Kant also notes that many individuals possess an inclination to do good; but however commendable such actions may be, they do not have moral worth when they are done out of pleasure. If, however, a philanthropist had lost all capacity to feel pleasure in good works but still did pursue them out of duty, only then we would say that they were morally worthy.

Kant states that this is how we should understand the Scriptural command to love even one's enemy: love as an inclination or sentiment cannot be commanded, only rational love as duty can be.

Second Proposition

Scholars disagree about the precise formulation of the first proposition. One interpretation asserts that the missing proposition is that an act has moral worth only when the agent is motivated by respect for the law, as in the case of the man who preserves his life only from duty. Another interpretation asserts that the proposition is that an act has moral worth only if the principle acted upon generates moral action non-contingently.  If the shopkeeper in the above example had made his choice contingent upon that would serve the interests of his business, then his act has no moral worth.

Kant's Second Proposition states:

[A]n action from duty has moral worth not in the purpose to be attained by it but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon, and therefore does not depend upon the realization of the object of the action but merely upon the principle of volition in accordance with which the action is done without regard for any object of the faculty of desire.

A maxim of an action is its principle of volition. By this, Kant means that the moral worth of an act depends not on its consequences, intended or real, but on the principle acted upon.

Third Proposition

Kant combines these two propositions into a third proposition, a complete statement of our common sense notions of duty. This proposition is that "duty is necessity of action from respect for law." This final proposition serves as the basis of Kant's argument for the supreme principle of morality, the categorical imperative.

Categorical Imperative: Universality

Kant believes that all our actions, whether motivated by inclination or morality, must follow some law. For example, if a person wants to qualify for nationals in ultimate frisbee, he will have to follow a law that tells him to practice his backhand pass, among other things. Notice, however, that this law is only binding on the people who wants to qualify for nationals in ultimate frisbee. In this way, it is contingent upon the ends that he sets and the circumstances that he is in. We know from the third proposition, however, that moral law must bind universally and necessarily, i.e., regardless of ends and circumstances.

At this point, Kant asks, "What kind of law can that be, the representation of which must determine the will, even without regard for the effect expected from it...?" He concludes that the only remaining alternative is a law that reflects only the form of law itself, namely that of universality. Thus, Kant arrives at his well-known categorical imperative, the moral law referenced in the above discussion of duty. Kant defines the categorical imperative as the following:

I ought never to act in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become universal law.

Later, at the beginning of Section Two, Kant admits that it is in fact impossible to give a single example of an action that could be ceratinly said to have been done from duty alone, or ever to know one's own mind well enough to be sure of one's own motives. The important thing, then, is not whether such pure virtue ever actually exists in the world; the important thing is that that reason dictates duty and that we recognize it as such.

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